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If the Shoe 
Fits ... 
by Donald J. Katz 
In the case of Shaffer v. Heitner, 97 
S.Ct. 2569 (1977), the Supreme Court 
has determined that state court jurisdic-
tion is no longer based on the standards of 
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714. The Court 
now holds that the jurisdictional standard 
of "minimum contacts" applied to per-
sonal actions in International Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, also governs 
in rem and quasi-in-rem actions. 
Heitner, a non-resident of Delaware, 
owned one share of stock in Greyhound 
Corporation, a Delaware corporation. He 
filed a shareholder's derivative suit in 
Delaware state court, alleging that 
Greyhound, a subsidiary in California, 
and twenty-eight present or former of-
ficers or directors of the two corporations 
had violated their corporate duties. He 
claimed the defendants had involved the 
corporations in activities in Oregon which 
caused a private anti-trust suit that 
resulted in substantial damages as well as 
fines from a criminal contempt action. 
Simultaneously, Heitner filed fI moti<m 
for an order of sequestration of property 
under 10 Del. C. § 366. He also filed sup-
porting affidavits that the defendants were 
non-residents and identifying the pr'operty 
to be sequestered as stock, stock options, 
warrants of purchase and other corporate 
rights of the defendants. An order of se-
questration was signed later the same day . 
and the court appointed a sequestrator to 
"seize" and stop transfers of the defen-
dants' stock shares and options. 
In Delaware, the stock of all corpora-
tions existing under the state's law has a 
situs there. For purposes of the sequestra-
tion statute, the stock certificates were 
considered to be statutorily present in 
Delaware and subject to seizure even 
though they weren't physically present in 
the state. 
Property was seized from twenty-one of 
the defendants. A special appearance was 
entered in an attempt to quash service of 
process and to vacate the sequestration 
order. The defendants contended they 
were denied procedural due process, an 
issue the Supreme Court chose not to 
reach. They also contended their property 
seized was not capable of attachment and 
their contacts with the state of Delaware 
were insufficient under International 
Shoe, to sustain state court jurisdiction. 
The Delaware Chancery Court rejected 
these arguments. Finding no state law or 
federal constitutional barriers to the 
statute in its procedural application, the 
Chancery Court held that the statutory 
situs of the stock was sufficient to support 
quasi-in-rem jurisdiction. 
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme 
Court affirmed, holding that application 
of the International Shoe test was not at 
issue. The Court reasoned that jurisdic-
tion was quasi-in-rem based on the pres-
ence of the stock in Delaware through its 
statutory situs of ownership. Since the 
presence of the stock wasn't based on 
prior contacts with the forum, the seizure 
was not held invalid for failure to meet the 
minimum contacts test of International 
Shoe. 
The United States Supreme Court 
reversed. The Court said that Delaware's 
rejection of the jurisdictional challenge 
assumed the continued validity of Pen-
noyer v. Neff, that quasi-in-rem jurisdic-
tion is based on property present in or at-
tached to the state, but doesn't require con-
tacts between the defendants and the 
state. 
Departing from the past, the Court 
decided that the jurisdictional scheme 
outlined in Penn oyer is circular in reason-
ing and that the idea of jurisdiction over 
property really means jurisdiction over 
the interests of persons in property. Thus, 
the basis for an exercise of in rem jurisdic-
tion must be sufficient to justify an exer-
cise of jurisdiction over the interests of 
persons in property. 
The minimum contacts standard, as set 
out in International Shoe, will now deter-
mine whether an exercise of in rem or 
quasi-in-rem jurisdiction is consistent 
with due process. 
According to the Court, while cases 
having their source of controversy in 
claims to the property itself will generally 
support state court jurisdiction, the pres-
ence of a defendant's property in a state is 
merely evidence that jurisdiction exists. 
Applying the facts of Shaffer, the 
Supreme Court determined that the pres-
ence of corporate holdings that were 
neither the subject matter of the litigation 
nor related to the underlying cause of ac-
tion were insufficient contacts for jurisdic-
tion of Heitner's action in Delaware. 
The presence of property in a state 
might suggest other ties between the de-
fendant, the state, and the litigation, but if 
the property serving as the basis for an ex-
ercise of state court jurisdiction is com-
pletely unrelated to the plaintiff's cause of 
action, the presence of property alone 
won't support jurisdiction. If other con-
tacts or ties don't exist, the case can't be 
brought in that forum. 
However, a debtor won't be able to 
avoid legal obligations by removing prop-
erty to a state where his creditor can't ob-
tain jurisdiction, the Court notes. The Full 
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Faith and Credit Clause makes enforce-
able the judgment of one state in all 
others. Once a court of competent juris-
diction in one state has determined that a 
defendant is the debtor of a plaintiff, it 
will allow an action on the debt in other 
states where the defendant has property, 
even if the latter wouldn't originally have 
had jurisdiction to determine the debt. 
A number of reasons why contacts with 
a state can support a finding of jurisdic-
tion are given by the Court. A defendant's 
claim to property located in a state would 
normally indicate an expected benefit 
from the state's protection of that prop-
erty. A state has an interest in assuring the 
marketability of property within its bor-
ders as well as in providing a procedure 
for peaceful resolution of disputes about 
posseSSion of the property. Also, there is 
the likelihood that important records and 
witnesses will be found in the state where 
the property is located. The Court notes, 
however, that while these and other fac-
tors may affect a decision as to jurisdic-
tion, none is necessarily decisive. 
It's Alright 
Ma (Bell) 
by Andrew S. Katz 
With a proper order from a United 
States District Court, federal law enforce-
ment officials may now compel your local 
telephone company to provide facilities 
and technical assistance in support of 
electronic surveilance operations author-
ized by warrant. In the decision of United 
States v. New York Telephone Company, 
46 U.S.L.W. 4033 (Dec. 6, 1977), the 
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United States Supreme Court upheld an 
order of the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York authoriz-
ing agents of the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation to install pen registers (a 
device that records the numbers dialed on 
a telephone) and directing the New York 
Telephone Company to provide the FBI 
with the information and facilities neces-
sary to employ the pen registers covertly 
during the investigation of an illegal gam-
bling operation. 
The District Court issued the order on 
the basis of an FBI affidavit stating that 
there was probable cause to believe that 
two telephones in Manhattan were being 
used in furtherance of illegal gambling ac-
tivity. The Company refused fully to com-
ply with the court order, locating the lines 
that were of interest but refusing to lease 
to the FBI unused lines needed to operate 
their equipment without notice. Although 
the FBI was authorized to compensate the 
Company for its assistance, the agents 
were advised to string their own cables to 
the suspects' apartment, a task impossible 
to accomplish without alerting the 
suspects. The Company moved in the Dis-
trict Court to vacate that part of the order 
directing it to furnish facilities and techni-
cal assistance to the FBI on the ground 
that the order could only be issued in con-
nection with a wiretap order meeting the 
requirements of Title III of the Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 
1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520. It 
denyed that the District Court possessed 
authority to give the order under either 
Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 41 or the All Writs 
Act, 28 U.s.c. § 1651(a). The District 
Court held that pen registers are not 
governed by Title III because they do not 
intercept oral communication, they only 
record phone numbers. It claimed jurisdic-
tion to issue the order upon a showing of 
probable cause relying upon the authority 
of the All Writs Act and its "inherent 
powers" to direct the Company to assist 
the FBI. 
In Application of the United States of 
America in the Matter of an Order 
Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register or 
Similar Mechanical Device, 538 F.2d 956 
(2d. Cir. 1976), the Court of Appeals 
agreed with the District Court on the 
scope of Title III and the power to author-
ize pen register surveilance under Fed. 
Rule Crim. Proc. 41. However, the ma-
jority also held that "in the absence of 
specific and properly limited Congres-
sional action, it was an abuse of discretion 
for the District Court to order the 
Telephone Company to furnish technical 
assistance." 538 F. 2d at 961. The Court 
of Appeals warned that "such an order 
could establish a most undersirable, if not 
dangerous and unwise, precedent for the 
authority of the federal courts to impress 
unwilling aid on private third parties" and 
that "there is no assurance that the court 
will always be able to protect (third par-
ties) from excessive or overzealous 
Government activity or compUlsion." 538 
F. 2d at 962-963. The District Court's 
order against the Company was invali-
dated and a petition for certiorari was 
granted by the Supreme Court. 
Justice White's majority opinion 
(joined in by Chief Justice Burger and 
Justices BIackmun, Powell, and Rehn-
quist) reviews the language and legislative 
history of Title III and concludes that pen 
registers are not within the scope of its re-
quirements. Title III is concerned with the 
interception of wire or oral communica-
tion, "intercept meaning 'the aural aquisi-
tion of the contents of any wire or oral 
communication through the use of any 
electronic, mechanical, or other device.' 
18 U.s.c. § 2510(4). Pen registers do not 
acquire the 'contents' of communica-
tions .... " 46 U.S.L.W. at 4035. 
Therefore, reasons the majority, the Dis-
trict Court had authority to direct the 
Company to provide assistance to the FBI 
although the pen register order was not in 
conformity with Title III. 
By holding that the District Court had 
power to authorize the installation of the 
pen registers, the majority expands the 
meaning of search and seizure under Fed. 
Rule Crim. Proc. 41 to include a "search" 
to discover the use a telephone is being 
put to when there is a suspicion of its in-
volvement in a criminal venture. Rule 41 
authorizes warrants for seizures of prop-
erty or contraband and "property" is 
defined to include documents, books, 
papers and any other tangible objects. 
The opinion states that "it does not 
